Joshua Malay* and Matthew R. Fairholm
The main question this article seeks to address is how the BLM’s bureaucratic autonomy is affected by deep ideological divides over public lands management policy. Daniel Carpenter’s (2001) theory of bureaucratic autonomy serves to provide the definition and method for evaluating the research question. The case study identifies that the bureaucratic autonomy afforded is intrinsically bound to interest group politics. There exists little room for initiative not supported by specific interests. Actions required by the multiple use mandates, but not supported by interests will be suppressed. But, of greater interest is in understanding that once support shifts for an initiative all previous action is undone or at least mitigated to a point of inconsequence. Hence, limited bureaucratic autonomy is afforded either way. The multiple use requirements will not satisfy all parties, and does not allow the BLM to ignore other potential uses of the public lands.
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