

Violence as an Emergent Property

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Abstract

This paper argues that violence is an emergent property of the types of agents that constitute society. A categorization of the types of agents helps determine the social mechanisms and processes that prevent an appropriate understanding of violence. Introducing the concept of emergence allows an exploration of the different types of agents and emergent properties of violence that were elaborated and reproduced through social mechanisms and processes. The different aspects of violence and evil caused by the different types of agents are important issues that will be examined in order to solve the contradictions and misunderstandings that arise from the relationship between the types of evil doing and its relation to structural violence as an emergent property. Concepts that clarified the different types of emerging properties and the types of agents and its respective components were developed to shed light on the processes that gave rise to the issues that surround complex situations of violence.

Keywords: Violence; Emergent property; Diachronic emergence, Cultural properties, Structural properties; Agential properties

Introduction

The concept of emergence; “*expresses the idea that a thing...can have properties or capabilities that are not possessed by its parts*” [1]. These properties are called emergent properties. The concept has been a topic of debate for quite some time, especially within philosophy. The most commonly used examples that illustrate how complex systems can give rise to emergent properties have been water and consciousness. Water for example, possesses properties that are quite different from its components, oxygen and hydrogen. In the same way, the neuro-chemical interactions between brain cells cannot explain consciousness which is an emergent property of the complex system. The aim of this paper is to argue that violence is an emergent property of the types of agents that constitute society. A categorization of the types of agents helps determine the social mechanisms and processes that prevent an appropriate understanding of violence.

The idea that a ‘thing’ can have emergent properties has to be elaborated further. Elder-Vass conceptualizes ‘thing’ as an “entity” or ‘whole’ [1]. In this paper, instead of employing the term ‘entity’, the concept of agent will be used. This is because the concept of agent allows for a better understanding of the interplay that occurs in complex situations of violence at the individual and structural level as well as in the structural and cultural sphere.

Within the social sciences, the concepts of emergence and emergent properties offer the possibility to explain the causal powers of the different types of structures and agents. This means that structural and cultural violence, while having properties of their own; do not have to be necessarily detached from violence at the individual level since any kind of social actions precedes structural elaboration. The unique elements that characterize structural and cultural violence can be analyzed as the emergent properties of the social processes that action and interactions entail.

Analytical dualism, unlike the duality of structure, seeks to link agency with structure instead of merging them together. Social structure precedes and conditions action and socio-cultural interactions. Social actions and socio-cultural interactions in turn give rise to processes of structural elaboration and/or reproduction of the same structures that conditioned them. The key difference with the duality of structure is that it stresses the temporality by emphasizing that one process

happens before and/or after the other. Morphogenetic cycles are the temporal sequences that produce any transformation of the social structure and system. Morphostatic cycles on the other hand, are the temporal sequences that reproduce and maintain the form of any given social structure and system.

The temporality of the morphogenetic/static cycles unmasked by analytical dualism suggests that there is an end product for every social action and socio-cultural interaction that differs from the original structure and intention that conditioned and motivated them in the first place. It is a process that gives way to what Giddens has called the juggernaut of modernity and the unintended consequences of action [2-4]. The consequences of actions and interactions can be directed up to a certain extent, but it runs with the risk of both getting out of hand or becoming something completely different than what was originally anticipated.

Analytical dualism and the unintended consequences of action that stretch out in time and space entail the idea that there will be elements of the social world that are more than just the aggregate sum of actions and interactions. As Archer has pointed out that “*the emergent properties which characterize socio-cultural systems imply discontinuity between initial interactions and their product, the complex system*” [5]. Thus, the ‘self-regulating properties’ of social structures described in structuration theory is just another way of saying emergent properties.

Despite the role and importance that actions and socio-cultural interactions have in the creation of emergent properties at a larger scale, the capability to do so must not be exaggerated. Within the morphogenetic/static cycles, not all actions and interactions give rise to emergent properties at a large-scale, “*not only may some of the smallest items of behavior be irrelevant to the social system, certain larger ones may also be trivial, mutually cancelling or self-contained in their effects*” but depending on the case, “*other actions can produce far reaching aggregate and emergent consequences*” [5].

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So, what are the conditions that are needed in order for social actions and socio-cultural interactions to give rise to emergent properties? In order to answer this question, it is necessary to elaborate what are the mechanisms and processes that generate emergent properties in larger, complex structures based on the way lower agents interact. The important task here is to describe and shed light on how structural violence ends up with properties that are non-existent at the individual level despite being a consequence of actions and socio-cultural interactions. Ironically, analytically speaking the implication is that it is necessary *“to grapple with the ongoing interplay between micro-and macro-levels, where the broader context conditions the environment of actors whose responses then transform the environment with which the context subsequently has to deal, the two jointly generating further elaboration as well as changes in one another”* [5]. For the sake of building a coherent argument and because violence is a social phenomenon, individual agents are to be treated as the lowest components that build up agents and interactions at a higher-level.

The Elements of Emergence

Emergence occurs when an agent (entity) possesses characteristics and causal powers that are not possessed by the parts that compose it, in other words, emergent properties. An emergent property is defined as a property *“not possessed by any of the parts individually and that would not be possessed by the full set of parts in the absence of a structuring set of relations between them”* [1]. The key element (at least within the social sciences) for emergence then, is how a certain set of components are related and patterned with each other as to compose an agent at a higher-level that possesses properties not owned by its parts.

The interactions and relations between the components will determine whether an agent will have emergent properties or not and what kind of properties they are. Here, it is important to introduce two elements of emergence: levels and relations.

Agency as the *‘capability of doing things’* is not something that is exclusively possessed by individuals. Collectives, organizations and arguably even societies possess agency. Studies of social phenomena have to work with the premise that individuals are the lowest possible components of the social world in order to exclude the chemical and biological components that are outside the scope of the social sciences.

The hierarchy of agents in the social world then, starts with individual agents and the higher-level agents that are composed by their patterned interactions. An agent’s emergent property depends on *“being composed of a collection of lower-level entities (agents) that are its necessary parts, and on the properties of those parts; but not on the presence or properties of other entities that are not its parts”* [5].

An agent with emergent properties then, is further composed of parts that may or may not possess a set of emergent properties of their own. A number of individuals with agential emergent properties compose a collectivity or organization that possesses emergent properties that are not possessed by its components. This creates layers, termed levels, in which an agent is composed of a specific patterned set of relations of lower level agents. Individuals compose collectivities, and collectivities may in turn compose organizations.

As it was pointed out above, in complex situations of violence it is necessary to label the individual as being the lowest form of component. The way individual agents are aggregated influences both the type of higher level agents and the emergent properties it will possess. Details on these points will be discussed in the subsequent sections of this chapter.

The other important element of emergence besides the level of agents, is the way these agents are related and therefore, interact with each other. The role of interactions and relations for the creation of emergent properties is highly important. The way the parts and components are patterned will determine whether or not a higher-level agent possesses emergent properties and what are those properties going to be. Archer, rightly points out that *“emergence is embedded in interaction.... emergent properties are therefore relational: they are not contained in the elements themselves but could not exist apart from them...although complex social systems have their foundation in simpler ones, they have their own dynamics with emergent properties”* [5].

Large-scale genocides and vast military operations for example, rely on the way individual agents are organized which enables collectivities and organizations to develop emergent properties that differ from its parts¹. The relational approach to emergence then, argues that agents acquire emergent properties *“because of the particular relationships that hold between the parts in a particular kind of whole....higher-level entities (agents) are not just a simple aggregation of their component parts”* [1]. This point is beautifully illustrated in the phrase coined by Bauman: *“the uniqueness and normality”* of the holocaust.

What Bauman means with the uniqueness and normality of the holocaust is that the elements of modernity and bureaucratic structures that made the holocaust possible can be found at every corner of modern society. The aspect of the Holocaust analyzed by Bauman is unique, because *“it is modern...it brings together some ordinary factors of modernity which normally are kept apart”* [6]. These factors are the following:

- Radical antisemitism,
- Transformation of the anti-semitic ideology into policy,
- A centralized state,
- An efficient bureaucratic apparatus,
- State of emergency condition,
- Passive acceptance of the above elements by the population.

Except for a couple of factors, all of them can be found throughout society. What makes the difference is the way they are put together. A specific combination of these factors enables and constrains individual agents in a specific pattern of socio-cultural interactions. These interactions, in turn, by working within a complex bureaucratic machinery, gives rise to social process that end up in genocide. The structural dimensions observed in the holocaust are the emergent properties of these specific relations between individual agents.

The characteristics of the bureaucracy such as, a hierarchical and functional division of labor, the rational and scientific approach to problems, the double dehumanization of the subject and the object, by themselves are unable to create large-scale atrocities². They have to be combined in a way that patterns the social actions and socio-cultural interactions so that it gives rise to emergent properties at a higher-level.

The importance and role of the relations between the components of the agents at different levels show that there are relations and interactions between the agents *‘within and across’* levels. Archer summarizes this argument in the following manner:

¹For an example of this point, see Bauman 1989 and Giddens 1985

²For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of bureaucracy elaborated in this point, see Bauman, 1989; Mouzelis, 2007; Vetlesen, 2005; and Weber, 1978.

The primary distinguishing feature of any emergent property is the natural necessity of its internal relations, for what the entity (agents) and its very existence depends upon them. To focus upon internal and necessary relations between components as constitutive of an emergent property is to set them apart from relations which are external and contingent. In the latter case, two entities or items can exist without one another and “*it is thus neither necessary nor impossible that they stand in any particular relation to one another*”, for the nature of either does not depend upon this.

The example given by Archer to illustrate this point are the practices of 19th century education and industry represented by the Anglican church and industrialists. They were both separated in their own internal relations but also possessed a relation that had significant effects in each other (the relation between workforce education and entrepreneurial development).

Agents interact with other agents within the same level, which in turn it may or may not give rise to emergent properties in higher-level agents that are composed by a specific type of relation among its components.

Thus, the hierarchy of levels between the agents should not be considered as homogenous and static. At any given level, “*it is possible that a variety of different classes of higher-level entity (agent) may emerge*” [1]. From the same token, any kind or number of emergent properties may emerge depending from the combination and interaction of lower-level agents. It is more of a branch, rather than a static strata [7].

Another possibility besides the bureaucratic dimension of violence of the holocaust as an emergent property is what Ted Poston termed ‘social evil’. Social evil is “*the pain and suffering which results from the game-theoretic interaction of rational, well-intentioned individuals*” [8]. Poston argued that even in the extreme situation where all the individual agents were well-intended virtuous, the result could still be a social evil that inflicted pain and suffering.

Structural violence as a type of perpetrator-less violence that is built into the structure, and social evil as the aggregate result of rational individual agents can be interpreted as strong and weak emergence respectively. Strong emergence views emergent properties as being something that is much more than the result of its aggregate parts. What this means, is that emergent properties cannot be explained as the result of the relations and interactions of lower-level agents. According to Kim, proponents of strong emergence argue that emergent properties are “*not explainable, or reductively explainable, on the basis of their ‘basal conditions’, the lower-level conditions out of which they emerge*” [1].

Weak emergence on the other hand, advocates that emergent properties can be explainable based on the interactions and relational patterns of the lower-level agents. It can be criticized as being reductionist, but nevertheless offers valuable insights especially in the study of social phenomena where the materialistic and idealistic structural conditions enable and constrain the actions of agents.

The problem is that complex situations of violence seem to be a little bit of both. A military invasion can be analyzed from the standpoint of the hierarchical bureaucratic structure of military organizations but also contains conditions and properties that are beyond the sum of the interactions and relations of the agents involved. In the same manner, the poverty and suffering created by global capitalism as a form of structural violence cannot be fully grasped by using only one approach.

The arguments presented on this paper take a middle stance, by analyzing the mechanisms that underlie the interactions and relations of agents while acknowledging the existence of the unintended consequences of action that stretch out in time and space.

Diachronic Emergence

The above-mentioned elements of emergence are the emergent properties that can be identified from a synchronic perspective. In other words, it captures emergence and emergent properties as they are across one point in time. Theorists such as Elder-Vass refuse to acknowledge the lay definition of emergence, which is the diachronic definition that represents the idea that ‘*something*’ emerges through time. The reason used to oppose it is because a diachronic view of emergence does not capture the specific way the components are related and the causal powers these relations give rise to.

A diachronic conception of emergence is however important for two reasons. The first reason is that social processes happen through time and with it, certain events come into being. The second reason is that without a diachronic conception of emergence, it becomes nearly impossible to include the consequences of the interactions and actions of the components of an agent that stretch out in time and space.

To illustrate this, studies on the holocaust once again prove to be useful. Raul Hilberg once argued that the stages for events of mass destruction such as the holocaust were logically determined [6]. This statement however must be approached carefully because it excludes the unplanned and contingent dimension that gave rise to the holocaust.

Christopher Browning described the way the final solution ‘*evolved*’ and came to be. Browning argued that there was a gap between what the Nazis wanted to do and actually ended up doing between 1939 and 1941. This has led to the misconception that the holocaust did not emerge diachronically but was planned all along:

Expulsion and ghettoization...is what the Germans sought to do... (and) what they actually did. Too often, however, these policies and this period have been seen through a perspective influenced, indeed distorted and overwhelmed, by the catastrophe that followed. The policy of Jewish expulsion, and its relationship to resettlement policies in general, was for many years not taken as seriously by historians as it had been by the Nazis themselves. Conversely, the policy of ghettoization has all too often been seen as an integral, even conscious, preparatory step toward extermination, while to the Germans at the time it was a temporary improvisation, a “*necessary evil*” that followed from the failure of expulsion plans [9].

It is important to recognize both the synchronic and diachronic aspects of emergence because without the specific patterns of interaction and relation that agents have within a bureaucratic organization, the spontaneous and improvised manner in which complex situations of violence come into being cannot be grasped.

Hannah Arendt also recorded the way in which the final solution developed. The trial and error approach given to the ‘*Jewish problem*’ was described in the three solutions: expulsion, concentration and killing [10]. The three solutions are also known as the first, second and ‘*Final Solution*’ respectively. Through her report and insights of Eichmann and his work, Arendt discussed the solutions suggested by the Nazis in order to realize a *judenrein* Europe. The Madagascar Plan, the Jewish Ghettos and the Final Solution are only a few examples of the manner how violence can emerge diachronically from a synchronic set of arrangements that determine the way agents interact and act.

Complex situations of violence are not the only social processes that have the synchronic and diachronic capabilities of emergence. Individuals can also give rise to properties that were not originally there depending on the situation and the way they are organized and related to others. Face-to-face killings for example, show how individual agents can adjust their capability to act, and hence their causal power depending on the social context they are in.

The chordal triad of agency developed by Emirbayer and Mische, explains how agents adjust and shift their temporal focus to reproduce or transform their actions and environment. The “*degree of changeability or mutability of different actual structures, as well as the variable (and changing) ways in which social actors relate to them*” [11]. The temporal dimensions of agency, provides a dynamic model that makes it possible to understand in what way agents adapt to the social contexts they are located in. The “*temporal-relational contexts support particular agentic orientations, which in turn constitute different structuring relationships of actors toward their environments*” [11]. Rigid structures, make agents adjust their temporal orientations to the past as to reproduce as much as possible the structure that existed prior to their action. Less rigid structures on the other hand make it easier for agents to adjust their temporal orientations in a way that focuses either on the present or the future. This process in turn causes a structural elaboration that changes the structure that conditioned the original action. The chordal triad of agency model has been applied by Cushman to analyze how the Serbian elite adjusted their temporal dimensions of agency to devise the Bosnian genocide [12].

One of the reasons agents emerge (regardless of the level) is precisely because emergence happens over time. Along with the social processes that give rise to its existence, agents at different levels may acquire properties that are not possessed by its part because of the relations and interactions that happen over time.

Without the notion of temporality, it becomes nearly impossible to analyze the processes that underlie emergence and the emergent properties possessed by the different types of agents. This means that there are different types of emergent properties that in turn depend on the way agents interact at the structural and individual level. Different ways of constraining and enabling action gives rise to different emergent properties.

The Types of Emergent Properties

As it was discussed in previous chapters, agency and structure are linked by morphogenetic and morphostatic cycles that in turn produces new temporal sequences that affect both the socio-cultural interactions and the structural elaborations. It was also argued, through Sewell's reformulation that structure has a virtual and materialistic dimension. These points are important, because it shows how different dimensions of structure can affect lower-level agents in differing ways.

Structural Emergent Properties

Sewell reformulated the concept of structure in a way that linked the material and virtual dimension of structure [13]. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the two aspects are elided in an inseparable manner that does not allow an appropriate analysis of the different manifestations of structural violence. The triangle and triumvirate of violence were originally conceived as to represent this idea. The goal however is to explore how violence is related at a structural and individual level without jeopardizing their respective independent characteristics.

In this sense, it is important to *analytically* separate the different properties and causal power that structure has while bearing in mind Sewell's reformulation of structure. The reason is because the materialistic dimension of structure entails different processes and properties from those of the more symbolic and virtual dimension of structure. Based on this, the emergent properties that largely but not exclusive depend on the materialistic side of structure is termed as structural emergent properties (SEP's).

Structural emergent properties (SEP's), are “*irreducible to people and relatively enduring, as with all incidences of emergence, are specifically defined as those internal and necessary relationships which entail material resources, whether physical or human, and which generate causal powers proper to the relation itself*” [7]. The predetermined and rigid nature of material structure makes it difficult to fully categorize as an unintended consequence. As shown with the examples of diachronic emergence given above, structural emergent properties can be in fact the unintended consequences of action but only as a sub-category and never an equivalent social process.

Structural emergent properties, because of their materialistic nature can be used to enable large-scale atrocities. The dehumanizing process, so necessary for the implementation of mass murders, is easier to produce with the structural emergent properties that influence the way individual agents act and interact. It can create a machine that belittles the will and thought of individual agents to nullify the ‘animal pity of men’. These properties, where captured in the descriptions made by Stanley Milgram [14] and the analysis of the holocaust carried out by Zygmunt Bauman [6].

The terrifying aspect of the way interactions are patterned in a materialistic structure reveals the structural properties that are reflected in the social mechanisms of bureaucratic organizations. The mediation of action, the fragmentation of tasks and double dehumanization created by the physical distance and routinization of tasks would all be inconceivable without the material dimension of structural emergent properties.

Cultural Emergent Properties

Cultural emergent properties (CEP's) arise from the idealistic (virtual) dimension of structures. They are a consequence of the structural elaboration and/or reproduction of the symbolic sphere that follow socio-cultural interactions. CEP's work in the same way as structural emergent properties since both of them are but one side of structure. Archer however, would disagree because she differentiates cultural systems from structures [7,15]. The argument for this is that while acknowledging the merits of Sewell's reformulation, she believes that the concept of structure developed by Sewell suffers from the elision between the materialistic and idealistic dimension of structure. This criticism must be examined carefully, because separating the idealistic and materialistic dimension of structure too much would just recreate the issues that Giddens and Sewell set themselves to solve.

Although it is true that an analytical separation of the structural and cultural emergent properties is required to analyze social processes like violence, it must nevertheless be kept in mind that they are two sides of the same coin. The reason is because just as cultural emergent properties and structural emergent properties have the same mechanisms to manifest themselves, they are similar in the way agents draw upon them to cause structural elaboration and reproduction.

Practically, cultural emergent properties emphasize the symbolic (virtual) manifestation of violence: cultural and symbolic violence. The

symbolic sphere (called cultural system by Archer), is characterized by the pre-existence, autonomy and durability” of its constituents [15]. It is what makes it possible to be identified and implemented by agents.

Here, it is important to differentiate between the causal consensus and logical consistency that happen when agents draw upon the properties of the symbolic sphere. Causal consensus is the imposition from an agent (or agents) upon others to legitimize, manipulate or argument. Causal consensus tends to expose how the symbolic sphere is linked to power relations and the way it can be used to influence others. The logical consistency of the symbolic sphere on the other hand emphasizes the autonomy of the cultural realm (cultural systems). It shows how culture is autonomous and independent. This shows how it is linked but independent on agents depending on whether or not they drawn upon its elements. In Archer’s words, “*causal relationships are contingent...whereas logical relationship do obtain, and when internally and necessarily related they constitute cultural emergent properties*” [15].

Agential (People’s) Emergent Properties

The arguments presented throughout the present chapter work on the premise that individual agents are the lowest form of components in the hierarchy of agents with emergent properties. The agents’ capability of doing things as well as their capacity to refrain from taking any course of action are the emergent properties that agency entails. It also implies that agents, at any given moment in time could have done otherwise regardless of the socio-historical context they were located at and the course of action that was taken.

The agential emergent properties of an individual rests on the agency inherent to human beings [16]. The agents’ capability to act depending on the structural and cultural properties that condition their action lie in turn on the ability to adjust the temporal dimensions of agency. Emirbayer and Mische expressed this idea with their concept of chordal triad of agency [11].

The chordal triad of agency is composed of three temporal dimensions:

1. International element which is the “*the selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of thought and action, as routinely incorporated in practical activity, thereby giving stability and order to social universes and helping to sustain identities, interactions, and institutions over time*”,
2. Projective element defined as “*the imaginative generation by actors of possible future trajectories of action, in which received structures of thought and action may be creatively reconfigured in relation to actors’ hopes, fears, and desires for the future*” and
3. Practical-evaluative element which is “*the capacity of actors to make practical and normative judgments among alternative possible trajectories of action, in response to the emerging demands, dilemmas, and ambiguities of presently evolving situations*” [11].

Agents have the ability to adapt and adjust their courses of action precisely because agency is simultaneously constituted of the three temporal elements. Agents are able to express and manifest their courses of action by drawing on the structural and cultural conditions that precede their actions. The structural emergent properties of the materialistic dimension of structure and the cultural emergent properties of the idealistic dimension of cultures are summoned and used by agents in order to manifest the agential emergent properties inherent to agency.

The ability to use SEP’s and CEP’s to express agential emergent properties are also evident on the relational patterns between agents. As Archer said, “*agential relations themselves represent emergent powers... that is they modify the capacities of component members (affecting their consciousness and commitments, affinities and animosities) and exert causal powers proper to their relations themselves vis-à-vis other agents or their groupings (such as association, organization, opposition and articulation of interests)*” [7].

The structural elaboration or reproduction that follows the socio-cultural interactions of agents with agential emergent properties largely depend upon the capability of the agent to modify and exert its causal powers. Agents are able to take calculated actions towards a set of goals or projects, that go along with the conditions that were partially imposed by the materialistic and idealistic dimension of social structure.

It must be stressed that the structural and cultural emergent properties of structure and higher-level agents “*do not exist or operate independently*” from lower-level agents; “*they overlap, intertwine and are mutually influential*” [7]. By having determined the different emergent properties that arise from the materialistic and individualistic dimension of structure, it is now possible to see how they interact with the agential emergent properties of individuals.

The three types of properties and the realms they derive from, are intrinsically intertwined. The analytical necessity and usefulness of this separation made between the two types of emergent properties possessed by structure and the emergent properties of agents, is that it makes it possible to analyze the interplay between them.

It is only here that the types of agents can be elaborated. As it has already been pointed out, agency as the capability of doing things is an emergent property that is not exclusive of individuals. Collectives (aggregation of individuals) and organizations (large-scale rigid structural patterns of interaction) also possess agency. The types of agents are now apparent and can be categorized in the following typology:

1. Individual agents
2. Collective agents
3. Organizational agents.

Individual agents are the easiest type to grasp intuitively. Individuals (as well as the other types of agents for that matter) have the emergent properties that were outlined above. They are the lowest-level components of the social world while having emergent properties of their own.

These emergent properties are the ability that an individual possesses to adjust the courses of action and the interaction with other agents depending on the socio-historical context they are located in. It also refers to the ability to draw upon and be conditioned by the material and symbolic structures that exist at the time the action is being done. The temporal dimensions of their agency based on the routinized patterns of past structures, the present situation that emerged as the results of contingent conditions, and the ability to project future oriented goals and plan courses of action to achieve it; are all part of the elements that allow the individual agent to express its emergent properties.

Before making a further elaboration of the emergent properties of individual agents, it is first necessary to elaborate on the characteristics

of collective and organizational agents to understand how the relations between agents and emergent properties interact within and between themselves.

Archer has differentiated between two types of agency that change form and activate temporal sequences that may cause the transformation or reproduction of structures depending on the configurations of the structures that precede the agents' action. Primary agency, is the characterized by the relatively flexible bonds between the components of the agent.

Primary agency is therefore a characteristic form of agency for collective agents. Within the context of violence, collective agents are characterized by the spontaneous, face-to-face *collective* violence that is a property beyond the sum of its parts. Unlike organizational agents, collective agents tend to rely more on the symbolic domain of structures to activate morphogenetic and morphostatic cycles of violence. The primary agency of collective agents is *"inarticulate in their demands and unorganized for their pursuit, in which case they only exert the aggregate effects of those similarly placed who co-act in similar ways given the similarity of their circumstances"* [16]. Collectivities have also been elaborated in detail by Domingues [17,18]. The nature of collectivities and therefore, collective agents and the emergent properties they have differ depending on the way its components are configured. In order to implicitly illustrate this point, Domingues offers the following typology of collectivities:

1. Network (components without intention)
2. Categories (classes, gender, races, etc.)
3. Groups (peer groups, close friendships, community neighbors, etc.)
4. Encounters (face-to-face centers and events of interaction)
5. Social movements (loosely organized groupings such as political parties, associations or unions)
6. Organizations (the highest level of social system capable of developing intentionality)
7. Society (a form of total social systems).

Domingues however, fails to differentiate between collective agents and organizational agents. These two types of agents possess different types of agency and rely on a different dimension of structure and its emergent properties. It must be stressed that the capability and reliance of the collective and organizational agents to draw on specific dimensions of structure is not exclusive. In simpler words, while collective agents tend to be more conditioned by the symbolic domain of structure, they can also be conditioned by the materialistic dimension of structure that influences organizational agents and vice versa.

This is because there is a necessity to categorize and elaborate different ways violence is done by a group of individuals. Modern and postmodern genocides represent this difference: the former is carried out through rigid materialistic structural conditions, while the latter is carried out in a spontaneous face-to-face setting. Collective agents for example, tend to encompass *"a peculiar, cultural-symbolic, dimension"* [18]. Organizational agents on the other hand, because of their modern nature tend to *"seek out order, to build boundaries, practical and symbolic, of membership and exclusion"* and *"are habitually defined by the quality of having explicitly stated goals"* [17].

The argument being developed in this chapter therefore, advocates the view that organizations and societies tend to have more characteristics and properties of organizational agents and corporate agency. Although the emergent properties of organizational structures and the corporate agency that compose it are not exclusively of this specific form composition of the parts, the categorization proves to be useful when studying complex social situations of violence.

Primary agency entails the possibility of developing into corporate agency. Thus, depending on the way individual and collective agents' relation and interactions are organized, they can develop to compose organizational agents as well. This possibility of developing into a higher-level agent comes with the *"emergent powers of promotive organization and articulation of interests (such that they become party to negotiated societal transformations) [that] depends jointly on the conditional influences of SEPs (and CEPs) and how these mesh with social factors influencing the cohesion possible within collectivities"* [7].

Corporate agency, has the capability to transform *"itself in pursuing social transformation (or reproduction). Primarily it does this, in the course of its struggles, by inducing the elaboration of the institutional role structure. New roles are created, and these constitute new positions in which more people can willingly invest themselves"* [16].

Structure (material and symbolic dimensions) has emergent properties of its own and depending on the way it is configured it can cause morphogenetic or morphostatic cycles [16]. Therefore, the various types of agents are able to reconfigure their form depending on the relation and interactions of the components that give rise to the emergent properties.

Furthermore, the way higher-level agents' emergent properties are intertwined and interplay with the emergent properties of individual agents can be better understood with the concepts of superstructuration and intrastructuration developed by Roy Bhaskar [19]. Superstructuration and intrastructuration convey the idea that emergence *"consists in the formation of one or other of two types of superstructure...namely, by the superimposition (Model A) or intraposition (Model B) of the emergent level on or within the pre-existing on"* [19].

In this way, the emergent properties of a structure in its material and virtual dimension can be viewed as the unintended consequences of action that stretched out in time and space but the emergent properties of structure that influence and are embodied by lower-level agents can also be expressed with the processes described as structures that are superimposed or intraimposed upon agents and structures:

Super- or intra-structures may be formed on or within in. the totality, at least partially constituted by its geo-historical formation and context, is in open process, intrinsically and extrinsically, so that its form, elements and effects will be continuously *configurationally changing*.

Regarding the difference between collective and organizational agents and their respective emergent properties, it is never about the number of individual that compose said types of agents. The important aspects are the intrinsic qualities that determine and condition the relation between the parts that compose said agents. This in turn will give rise to emergent properties that are very different from those that would have been developed if the components were configured in a different way. A medium-scale bureaucratic organization will have very different emergent properties from those of a casual mob that is composed with the same number of individuals of those of the bureaucratic organization.

All the types of agents have emergent properties of their own but can also at the same time be the components within a level that give rise to emergent properties at a higher-level. In this sense, Archer's of structure (the materialistic domain) and culture (the symbolic domain) as having emergent properties of their own is on point. By the same token, structural violence, which is composed of both the materialistic and idealistic dimensions of structure, while being a social phenomenon that apparently seems to be something completely different and detached from lower-level agents, is in fact both the result of actions and interactions of lower level components that gave rise to its characteristic emergent properties.

The perpetrator-less aspect of structural violence is, in other words, an emergent property of the materialistic and idealistic elaboration of agents that act and interact in lower levels. It is a result that is conceived by a specific form of relations among the components of high-level emergent properties but is at the same time a structural elaboration that is more than just the sum of its aggregate parts.

The violence that "is exercised even if there are no concrete actors one can point to directly attacking others, as when one person kills another [20]", and the way it interacts with violence at the individual level is just the tip of the iceberg.

Conclusion

The key issue is to connect violence at the individual, collective and organizational levels with structural violence to shed light on issues that entail its social processes and determine what happens to accountability when harm is done by a collectivity or organization. By exploring how the forms of violence and evil doing change depending on the type of perpetrator (individual, collective or organizational), it also becomes clear how individual actions are related to structural violence. Examining the complex interplay between an individuals' actions in the context of social structures makes it possible to identify and analyze the emergent properties of socio-cultural systems and thus, structural violence as well.

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